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Public-Private Partnership: The Chinese
Dilemma
Henry GAO*
As noted by Greg Shaffer in his book ‘Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in
WTO Litigation’, the US and EU have different approaches to public-private partnership in
dealing with foreign trade barriers: the former tends to be more ‘bottom-up’, while the latter
tends to be ‘top-down’. Inspired by Shaffer’s work, this article examines China’s experience in
establishing public-private partnership. Initially, China appeared to prefer the American approach
by adopting the Rules on Trade Barrier Investigation (TBI), which empowers domestic firms to
petition the government directly to launch investigation against foreign trade barriers. However,
since 2005, China seems to have shifted to the European approach by adopting a ‘Quadrilateral
Coordination’ system, which pools together the resources of the Ministry of Commerce, local
government, and relevant industry associations to help affected individual firms to fight foreign
trade barriers.The article analyses the pros and cons of the two systems, the political and social
reasons for the shift, and how the new system has worked in practice with case studies. The
article concludes with thoughts on the lessons we can draw on the relationship between the
government and private firms in China, as well as how the public-private partnership will
develop in China in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
Like most other inter-governmental tribunals, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement mechanism may only be used by the governments of its
Members. However, as private firms are the main participants in international
trade, they are the ones which will ultimately benefit or suffer from the results of
the trade disputes.To help private firms protect their trade interests, several major
WTO Members have established mechanisms to promote public-private
partnership in international trade disputes. The two primary examples are the
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Trade Barrier Regulation of the EU and the Section 301 legislation in the US As
noted by Greg Shaffer in his leading work, ‘[t]he US approach to public-private
networks tends to be more “bottom-up”, with firms and trade associations playing
a proactive role.The EC approach tends to be “top-down,” with a public authority
(the European Commission) playing the predominant, entrepreneurial role’.1
According to Shaffer, such divergent approaches reflects the different ‘political and
economic structures, administrative cultures, and traditions of government-business
relations’ in the US and Europe.2
Following its accession to the WTO, China also established a trade barrier
investigation mechanism. However, for various reasons, the mechanism doesn’t
work well, as only two investigations have been conducted in the decade following
its establishment. Instead, since 2005, the Chinese government seems to prefer
another mechanism, i.e., the Quadrilateral Coordination mechanism, which has
been used much more frequently.What are the reasons for the low usage of the
TBI? What are the reasons for the shift from the TBI to the Quadrilateral
Coordination system?What are the differences between the TBI and Quadrilateral
Coordination system? How does the Quadrilateral Coordination system work in
theory and practice? What does the shift in approach tell us about the nature of
public-private partnership in China? In this article, we will explore these
important questions, and examine their broader implications on the relationship
between the public and private sectors in China in general.
2 THETRADE BARRIER INVESTIGATION MECHANISM3
To help Chinese firms deal with trade barriers in foreign markets, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of China (hereinafter ‘MOFTEC’)
promulgated Provisional Rules on Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation in 2002.4
After three years of provisional application, it was finalized as Rules on Foreign
Trade Barrier Investigation (hereinafter ‘Rules’) in 2005.5 According to the Rules,
domestic firms may petition the Ministry of Commerce (hereinafter
‘MOFCOM’)6 to launch investigations into foreign trade barriers,7 which are
defined as measures which violate international agreements, or impede, restrict or
1 Gregory Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnership in WTO Litigation (Washington, DC,
Brookings Institution Press, 2003) at 6.
2 Ibid.
3 For a detailed discussion of the TBI mechanism, see Henry Gao, ‘Taking Justice into Your Own
Hand: The TBI Mechanism in China’, Journal of World Trade 44, no. 3 (2010):633–659.
4 MOFTEC Order No. 31 of 2002, 23, Sep. 2002.
5 MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2005, 2 Feb. 2005.
6 The MOFTEC was restructured in 2003 as Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China (MOFCOM).
7 Articles 5–8.
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harm China’s exports or imports.8 If the MOFCOM agrees that the petition is
well-founded, it shall launch an investigation.9 During the investigation, the
MOFCOM may collect information in various ways, such as distributing
questionnaires, holding hearings, consulting experts, or conducting field trips in
the country under investigation.10 After investigation, if the MOFCOM
determines that the measures indeed constitute trade barriers as defined above, it
shall take necessary measures, such as holding bilateral consultations, initiating
multilateral dispute settlement procedure, or take other appropriate measures.11
Even though it was introduced with great fanfare, theTBI mechanism did not
turn out as expected. In its eleven years of existence, the mechanism has only been
invoked in two cases, i.e., the case on Japanese import quota on laver (seaweed) in
2004 and the case on US subsidies in the renewable energy sector in 2012.
In the Laver case, the applicant – Jiangsu Laver Association – filed a petition
against the import restrictions on laver imports by Japan on 25 February 2004.12
Under the Japanese regime, laver imports were subject to quota and licenses which
were only granted to imports from Korea.The applicant argued that this violated,
inter alia, the relevant provisions in the GATT,Agreement on Agriculture and the
Import Licensing Agreement. The MOFCOM launched an investigation on 22
April 2004 and found that the Japanese measure indeed constituted a trade barrier
in violation of itsWTO commitments. During the investigation, MOFCOM held
three rounds of consultations with the Japanese government from June to October.
To help achieve a mutually acceptable solution, MOFCOM suspended the
investigation in October and held many rounds of consultation with Japan. On 21
February 2005, Japan announced a new quota regime for laver imports. Under the
new regime, the restrictions on the country of origin for dry and seasoned laver
are abolished, and the overall global quota for dry and seasoned laver imports is set
at 400 million sheets. As the new regime removed the inconsistency with WTO
rules,MOFCOM terminated the investigation on 28 February 2005.13
In the US – Renewable Energy Subsidy case, the petition was filed by the China
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic
Products and China New Energy Chamber of Commerce of the All-China
Federation of Industry and Commerce on 24 October 2011. The applicants
alleged that various subsidy schemes maintained by the US federal and state
governments constituted prohibited subsidy under the Subsidy and Countervailing
8 Article 3.
9 Article 12.
10 Articles 19–22.
11 Article 23.
12 For a detailed discussion of the laver case, see Henry Gao, supra n. 3, at 643–649.
13 MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 of 2005, 28 Feb. 2005.
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Measures (hereinafter ‘SCM’) Agreement. The MOFCOM launched an
investigation on 25 November 2011.14 In the final decision issued on 20 August
2012, the MOFCOM concluded that the US measures indeed violated the
obligations in the SCM Agreement and vowed to take relevant actions to compel
the US to remove the WTO-inconsistent measures and provide fair treatment to
Chinese renewable energy products.15 The case is now pending before a WTO
panel.16
Given the high frequency of trade barriers affecting Chinese exports and the
relative ease of the TBI procedure, the low usage of the mechanism seems to be
puzzling. In a previous article, I noted the following reasons for the apparent
anomaly:17
First, traditionally, private firms in China lack direct access to the government.
When they encounter trade barriers abroad, they rarely seek to lobby government
to take actions on their behalf but often choose to solve the problems in other
ways.
Second, unlike their Western counterparts, the industry associations in China
are usually semi-official organizations established by the government. As they are
more interested in regulating rather than helping the firms, the private firms are
usually reluctant to turn to them for help when they face trade barriers.
Third, until 2006, the Chinese government was quite reluctant to use the
WTO dispute settlement system. Such conservative approach greatly reduces the
credibility of the threat of WTO action and in turn the appeal of the TBI
mechanism.
Fourth, in China,TBI is handled by a low-level division in the Bureau of Fair
Trade in the MOFCOM. Moreover, there is no institutional coordination
mechanism involving different ministries and agencies as in US and EU. Due to its
low-rank and lack of coordination, it is hard for the TBI Division to take major
initiatives and make important decisions onTBI activities.
3 THE NEWAPPROACH:THE QUADRILATERAL
COORDINATION MECHANISM
The lack of usage of the TBI mechanism does not mean that China is doing
nothing to curb trade barriers. Instead, since 2004, China has been exploring
another mechanism to help Chinese firms protect their interests abroad. As this
14 MOFCOM Announcement No. 69 of 2011, 25 Nov. 2011.
15 MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2012, 20 Aug. 2012.
16 United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China – Request for
Consultations by China,WT/DS437/1, 30 May 2012.
17 Henry Gao, supra n. 3, at 649–655.
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mechanism involves the cooperation of four parties, i.e., central government, local
government, industry association, and individual firms, it has been dubbed as the
‘Quadrilateral Coordination’ mechanism by MOFCOM.18
3.1 THE MOFCOM REGULATION
The main legal basis for the mechanism is the Regulations on Responding to
Anti-dumping Cases against Exports, which was promulgated by MOFCOM in
2006.19 The respective roles and functions of the four parties are defined in the
Regulations as follows:
(i) MOFCOM shall be responsible for the following:
(a) Formulate policies and measures to facilitate defence in anti-dumping
cases.20
(b) Collect information on foreign anti-dumping laws as well as
information on new investigations or reviews through the trade
offices in China’s overseas missions.21
(c) Disseminate information on anti-dumping cases, such as the initiation
of new investigations or reviews, the initiation of anti-offsetting or
anti-circumvention investigations, or any other information that may
have a major impact on the case.22 Such information is usually
circulated to the local government and industry associations first for
further dissemination to the responding firms.
(ii) The industry associations shall be responsible for the following:
(a) Establish export statistics monitoring system and appropriate
mechanism to collect information and provide feedbacks on foreign
trade remedy cases;23
(b) Organize training activities on anti-dumping laws on a regular
basis;24
(c) Provide assistance to responding firms on on-the-spot investigations
by foreign investigating authorities and defence on technical issues
18 See Pei Yue, ‘Mingque Siti Liandong zhong Sifang Zhize’ (‘Clarifying the Roles of the Four Parties
in the Quadrilateral Coordination System’), Guoji Shangbao (International Business Daily), 28 Jul.
2006. See also MOFCOM Research Institute, ‘Zhongguo Duiwai Maoyi 30 Nian’ [‘30 Years of
China’s Foreign Trade’] (Beijing, China Commerce and Trade Press, 2008), at 248.
19 MOFCOM Order No. 12 of 2006, 14 Jul. 2006.
20 Article 5.
21 Article 18.
22 Article 6.
23 Article 12.1.
24 Article 11.
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such as surrogate countries, market economy status and individual
dumping margins;25
(d) Help organize firms to participate in hearings and conduct
consultations and negotiations with foreign investigating authorities
and relevant industry associations and firms;26
(e) At the request of responding firms, provide assistance on issues
relevant to the negotiation of price undertaking agreements. If the
price undertaking agreement or the agreement to cease exports needs
to be signed by the government, the industry associations may
provide suggestions to the MOFCOM;27
(f) Help firms seek judicial review on the anti-dumping measures in the
investigating country;28
(g) Provide information on services provided by lawyers and establish
database on lawyers;29
(h) Publish on a regular basis information cases due for administrative
reviews in a given year on the websites of International Business
Daily and the industry association;30
(i) When coordinating the response of responding firms, the industry
associations shall consult MOFCOM in the following cases:31
(1) The value of the product under investigation is quite substantial;
(2) The market share of the product under investigation is quite
substantial and has major impact in the investigating country;
(3) The industry associations cannot reach agreement on the
coordination of the defence work and this may affect the result
of the case;
(4) The investigating authorities apply discriminatory policy or
investigating method against Chinese firms;
(5) Other important cases that merits consultation.
(j) To facilitate the defence by member firms, the industry associations
may establish special funds from its membership dues;32
(k) Coordinate the hiring of lawyers:33
25 Article 12.2.
26 Article 12.3.
27 Article 12.4.
28 Article 12.5.
29 Article 12.6.
30 Article 12.7.
31 Article 16.
32 Article 11.
33 Article 14.
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(1) If the responding firms request the industry association to
coordinate the hiring of lawyers, the industry association shall
hire lawyers on the basis of the principles of openness, fairness
and transparency.
(2) If two or more law firms are involved in the same case because
the responding firms select lawyers on their own, the industry
association shall coordinate the work of the different law firms to
ensure the effectiveness of the defence for the industry as a
whole.
(3) If any lawyer or law firm causes adverse effects or harm to the
interests of Chinese firms or industries during their
representation, the industry association shall duly notify the
responding firms.34
(iii) The local government shall be responsible for the following:35
(a) Inform the responding firms immediately upon receiving
information from MOFCOM;
(b) Collect the data on anti-dumping cases involving local firms, establish
system to receive and report the relevant information, and evaluate
the impact of foreign anti-dumping actions to local exports;
(c) Organize training activities on anti-dumping laws on a regular basis;
(d) Formulate policies and measures on the basis of local conditions to
facilitate the responses in anti-dumping cases;
(e) Coordinate the responses of local firms in anti-dumping cases at the
request of industry associations.
(iv) The rights and responsibilities of the responding firms are as follows:
(a) If a firm exported the product under investigation to the investigating
country during the period under investigation, it shall respond
actively to the investigation;36
(b) The firms shall regulate their export activities according to the law,
help maintain export order in the industry, and collect and collate
information on anti-dumping cases to report to the industry
associations on a timely basis;37
34 Article 15.
35 Article 17.
36 Article 3.
37 Article 8.
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(c) Responding firms shall enjoy the following rights:38
(1) Decide the way to respond to the investigation,
(2) Hire lawyers according to their own preferences,
(3) Obtain from the industry association information on the overall
progress of the investigation and the status of other responding
firms,
(4) Obtain guidance and assistance on the response from the
industry association,
(5) Provide advice or suggestions to the government on the
discriminatory practices of the investigating authorities.
(d) A responding firm shall not engage in any activities that may affect
the legitimate interests of other responding firms or undermine the
overall response of the industry.39
3.2 THE ZHEJIANG RULES
In addition, various local governments also issued more detailed rules on the
mechanism. The most representative among them is the Provisional Rules on
Responding to Anti-dumping Cases against Exports (hereinafter ‘the Zhejiang
Rules’),40 which was issued by the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province in
the same year as the MOFCOM Regulation. Compared with the MOFCOM
Regulation, the Zhejiang Rules mainly focuses on the role of the local
government and builds a well-functioning system that involves many different
departments in the local government.
First, the Department of Commerce in the Provincial Government shall take
charge of dealing with foreign anti-dumping measures against local exports.41 Its
primary tasks include conducting research to formulate relevant policies for the
province; guiding, administering and coordinating the relevant work for the
province; strengthening the provincial working mechanism to deal with foreign
anti-dumping measures; and other relevant work as directed by MOFCOM.42 In
addition, it shall make adjustment plans for key industries and products on the basis
of the anti-dumping pre-warning reports to guide the industrial restructuring.43
Similarly, the Bureaus of Commerce at the county level and above shall take
charge of the relevant work for its jurisdiction.44
38 Article 9.
39 Article 10.
40 Zhezheng Banfa No. 114 of 2006, 25 Aug. 2006.
41 Article 5.
42 Ibid.
43 Article 6.
44 Article 5.
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Second, the other relevant departments shall also provide the necessary
support, cooperation and assistance to firms and industry associations responding
to foreign anti-dumping measures. The following departments are specifically
identified by the Zhejiang Rules:45
First, the local Commission on Development and Reform shall make the
necessary adjustments and improvements to the industrial development plan of the
province and guide the investment flow to fit with the latest developments in
the local economic and social conditions and defence work against foreign
anti-dumping measures;
Second, the local Department of Justice shall help train lawyers who specialize
in responding to foreign anti-dumping measures and strengthen the regulation of
legal practice in the field;
Third, the local Department of Finance shall strengthen the financial support,
help accounting firms provide the accounting services in the response to foreign
anti-dumping actions, and enhance trainings on anti-dumping-related matters for
staff in accounting firms;
Fourth, the local Department of Personnel shall help train specialists to
respond to foreign anti-dumping actions and nurture the necessary human
resources;
Fifth, the local departments in charge of the approval of official overseas
business trips and the issuance of exit documents shall help facilitate the approval
of the delegations for responding to foreign anti-dumping actions and their
applications for exit documents;
Sixth, the local Customs Administration shall strengthen the disciplining of
firms with verified records of disrupting export order and violating industry
agreements;
Seventh, the local Department of Inspection and Quarantine shall strictly
enforce the quality standards on export products, establish a proper system to
evaluate the integrity of export firms, and cooperate with firms and industry
associations in the response to foreign anti-dumping actions;
Eighth, the administrative departments in charge of public security, civil
affairs, agriculture, industry and commerce, ocean, and fisheries at the county level
and above are also required to provide the necessary assistance on matters falling
under their respective jurisdictions.
The Zhejiang Rules also include additional obligations for industry
associations and exporting firms. In addition to assisting exporting firms to
respond to the investigations, the industry associations shall help firms to petition
the government to request consultations with the countries taking anti-dumping
45 Article 6.
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actions or resort to other multilateral channels, as well as exchange information
with foreign industry associations and help firms to conduct consultations,
negotiations or lobbying activities.46 However, exporting firms shall not engage in
disruptive practices such as price wars, and shall establish proper finance and
accounting system and internal management system that conforms to the
requirements of modern corporate system.47
In addition to allocating specific tasks to different actors, the Zhejiang Rules
further streamlines the working procedures through the following innovations:
The first is a pre-warning system for anti-dumping actions against local
exports. Established by the industry associations with the guidance of government
and the participation of firms, the pre-warning system aims to improve the sharing
and exchange of information among the actors.48 The pre-warning information
covered by the system falls under three categories:49 First, pre-warning on specific
products, which is based on the analysis of the key data such as export quantity,
price and growth rate of the product in question, the preference of the export
market in using trade remedies measures, as well as the history of anti-dumping
actions against the product. Second, pre-warning on the regulatory environment,
especially the change on laws and policies on trade remedies measures. Third,
pre-warning on the latest developments in specific cases. Such information is
usually obtained through key firms or industry associations, but may also be
obtained through foreign law firms or relevant information service providers.50
Depending on the degree of urgency of the matter, the warning is denoted in red,
amber or green.51 The highest level of warning is coded in red, which means that
there is a real threat of initiation of anti-dumping action based on the current level
of export.52 The next level is coded in amber, which means a potential threat of
anti-dumping action.53 The safest level is coded in green, which means that the
threat of anti-dumping action is rather remote and exports may proceed as usual.54
The second is strict time-limits for key steps in the process. For example,
upon receiving important or urgent pre-warning information, the industry
association shall report in writing to the Bureaus of Commerce at the county level
46 Article 7.
47 Article 8.
48 Article 9.
49 Zhejiang Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Guanyu Jianshe ‘Duiwai
Maoyi Yujing Jizhi Shifandian’ de Gongzuo Zhidao Yijian (Guiding Advice on Establishing
‘Foreign Trade Pre-warning Mechanism Models’) (hereinafter ‘Guiding Advice’), 29 Mar. 2007, Art.
2.2.
50 Ibid.
51 Zhejiang Rules, Art. 10.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
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and above within five working days,55 which shall in turn report to the Bureau of
Commerce at the higher level of government within three working days.56
Similarly, when the responding firms and industry associations hire lawyers, they
shall report to the provincial Department of Commerce the name, contact
information, affiliated law firm, address and the name of the collaborative foreign
firm within three working days.57 After the end of every quarter, the Bureaus of
Commerce at the county level and industry associations shall prepare a summary
report on the cases in the quarter and report to the provincial Department of
Commerce within fifteen days.58
3.3 THE MECHANISM IN ACTION
The mechanism works in either of two ways:
First, if the MOFCOM, through its overseas offices, first obtains information
on the launch of foreign trade remedy investigations, it shall collect the
information and inform the local government and the relevant industry
associations.The local government and industry associations will then analyse the
information, identify and inform the responding firms, and coordinate actions
among them. The firms will then hire the lawyers and make the necessary
preparations to respond to the investigations.
However, if the firm first obtains information about possible foreign trade
remedy actions through its overseas office or foreign importers or distributors, it
shall report the information back to the relevant industry associations. The
industry associations will then report to the local government and MOFCOM,
and coordinate the actions among the responding firms. Depending on the case,
MOFCOM may also engage in consultations with the foreign authorities at the
bilateral or multilateral level.
The operation of the mechanism in practice may be illustrated by the
response of the Jiaxing producers in the iron and steel fasteners anti-dumping case,
which was launched by the EU against China in November 2007.59 The case
affects a total of USD 760 million worth of exports from China. Among them,
USD 320 million are exported from Zhejiang Province, with USD 97 million
55 Article 9.
56 Zhejiang Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Guanyu Guanche Zhixing
<Zhejiangsheng Yingdui Chukou Fanqingxiao Zanxing Banfa> de Tongzhi (‘Notice on the
Implementation of Zhejiang Provisional Rules on Responding to Anti-dumping Cases against
Exports’) (hereinafter ‘Implementation Notice’), 28 Nov. 2006, Art. 4.
57 Ibid.
58 Zhejiang Rules, Art. 18.
59 European Commission, Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China, 2007/C 267/11, 9
Nov. 2007.
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from Jiaxing, a city in Zhejiang Province. Right after the European Industrial
Fasteners Institute lodged the complaint on 26 September 2007, the Jiaxing
Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association (hereinafter ‘the Association’)
learned the news from the Brussels office of the law firm Mayer Brown and
notified its member firms in its monthly newsletter published on 22 October
2007.60 The November newsletter made a special feature report which included
five articles on the EU anti-dumping case.61 Before the initiation of the
investigation, MOFCOM organized a national pre-warning seminar in Ningbo
City to notify the firms and encourage the firms to respond to the investigation.62
On 2 November 2007, the Jiaxing Bureau of Foreign Trade also held a
pre-warning meeting for the local firms.63 As most of the ninety firms affected by
the investigation are smaller firms, the Bureau suggested a collective response
strategy, which was adopted by the association.64 Pursuant to the strategy, the
association hired Guogang Law Firm in Beijing along with its partner firm in
Brussels – Crowell & Moring – on behalf of its members to contest the injury
finding.65 Guogang Law Firm also conducted a group session with the smaller
firms to help them complete the EU questionnaire and save the cost of
participating in the case.66 In addition, six big firms also prepared their own
responses.67
In addition to helping firms preparing for the legal defence, the association
also conducted lobbying activities both domestically and in Europe.68 For
example, in February 2008, the association sent a six-people delegation to
Europe.69 They lobbied the Commission officials, European importers (The
Foreign Trade Association), distributors (European Fastener Distributor
Association), user industries such as shipbuilders (Community of European
Shipyards Associations), as well as members of the EU Anti-dumping Advisory
60 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2007 Vol. 10, 22 Oct.
2007.
61 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2007 Vol. 11, 19 Nov.
2007.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2008 Vol. 1, 15 Jan.
2008.
66 Interview with Yang Fengdan at the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 21
Feb. 2013.
67 Ibid.
68 Zhu Zongwen, ‘Fanqingxiao An Oumeng Zhongcai: 5 Niannei Pingjun Zhengshou 80% Fanqingxiao
Shui’ (‘EU Decided Final Anti-dumping Duty: Average Rate of 80% for the Next Five Years’), 21
Shiji Jingji Baodao [21st Century Business Herald], 3 Feb. 2009.
69 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2008 Vol. 3, 24 Mar.
2008.
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Committee, such as Belgium and the Netherlands.70 They also visited China’s
Mission to the EU, which created a special taskforce headed by Minister
Counselor Yin Zonghua, advised the association, and participated in all their
lobbying activities in Brussels.71 Back at home, the Director of the Jiaxing Bureau
of Foreign Trade reported the latest development in the case to Director-General
Jin of the Provincial Department of Commerce, who promised to report to
MOFCOM and try to persuade them to put the case on the agenda of the
China-EU High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue to be held in the following
month.72
When the Commission finally decided on 26 January 2009 to impose
anti-dumping measures, the association fought back through three channels:
First is retaliatory measure. On 4 November 2008, the Commission indicated
in its disclosure on definitive measures that high anti-dumping duties would be
imposed on most Chinese exporters.The association held an emergency meeting
together with the National Fasteners Association and sister associations from cities
of Ningbo and Wenzhou on 15 November 2008.73 At the meeting, the
associations decided to retaliate with an anti-dumping investigation against
European exports.74 On 1 December 2008, along with the association, the
National Fasteners Association submitted an application for anti-dumping
investigation to MOFCOM, which decided to initiate the investigation on 29
December 2008.75 In June 2010, MOFCOM announced that final anti-dumping
duties ranging from 6.1% to 26% will be imposed on fasteners imported from
EU.76
Second is WTO litigation.When the Commission announced the definitive
measures on 26 January 2009, the association issued a strong-worded statement on
3 February 2009 to express its ‘total disagreement and strong dissatisfaction’ against
the EU measure and ‘strongly urged the Chinese government to sue the EU in the
WTO’.77 Two days later, the official spokesperson for MOFCOM reiterated the
strong dissatisfaction and said that ‘China will study and evaluate the EU decision
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2008 Vol. 11, 16 Nov.
2008.
74 Ibid.
75 MOFCOM Announcement 115 of 2008, 29 Dec. 2008.
76 MOFCOM Announcement 40 of 2010, 28 Jun. 2010.
77 Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, ‘Guanyu Jianjue Fandui Ouweihui dui
Wo Jingujian Zhengshou Gaoe Fanqinxiaoshui de Shengming’ (‘Statement of Strong Opposition
Against the High Anti-dumping Duty Imposed by the European Commission against Chinese
Fasteners’), Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2009 Vol.
2, 4 Feb. 2009.
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and reserve the right for WTO litigation’.78 After several unsuccessful attempts to
resolve the matter through bilateral dialogue,79 China filed a formal complaint in
theWTO on 31 July 2009.80 In December 2010, theWTO Panel issued its report
and found that the EU violated various provisions in the Anti-dumping
Agreement and GATT.81 In July 2011, the Appellate Body Report also affirmed
most of the findings of the Panel Report.82
Third is judicial review. On 26 April 2009, Gem-Year and Jinn-Well
Auto-Parts, the presiding member of the association filed a case against the council
decision in the European Court of Justice.83 After the General Court dismissed
the case on 10 October 2012,84 the plaintiff brought an appeal on 20 December
2012.85 The case is currently pending in the European Court of Justice.
To ensure the effectiveness of its actions, the association also helped the firms
with various follow-up actions, such as providing advice on the
anti-circumvention regulations of the EU for firms which wish to invest in third
countries and export through them,86 urging firms to participate in the interim
review87 as well as the special review to implementWTO rulings.88
78 MOFCOM, Shangwubu Xinwen Fayanren jiu Oumeng Duihua Jingujian Caiqu Fanqingxiao
Cuoshi Fabiao Tanhua’ (‘MOFCOM Spokesperson Talks about the EU Anti-dumping Measure
against Chinese Fasteners’), 28 Jan. 2009, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ag/2
00901/20090106018746.shtml.
79 MOFCOM, Shangwubu Xinwen FayanrenYaojian Guanyu Zhongguo jiu Oumeng Duihua
Jingujian Fanqingciao Cuoshi Tiqi WTO Zhengduan Jiejue Jizhi xia Cuoshang Qingqiu Fabiao
Tanhua, 31 Jul. 2009, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ag/200907/20090706433
189.shtml.
80 European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners
from China - Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS397/1, G/L/891, G/ADP/D79/1, 4
Aug. 2009.
81 Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or
Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, adopted 28 Jul. 2011, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R.
82 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Iron or Steel Fasteners from China,WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 Jul. 2011.
83 Action brought on 24 Apr. 2009 – Gem-Year and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang) v. Council, (Case
T-172/09), (2009/C 153/90).
84 Judgment of the General Court of 10 Oct. 2012 — Gem-Year and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang) v.
Council (Case T-172/09), (2012/C 366/57).
85 Appeal brought on 20 Dec. 2012 by Gem-Year Industrial Co. Ltd, Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang)
Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 10 Oct. 2012
in Case T-172/09: Gem-Year Industrial Co. Ltd v. Council of the European Union, (Case C-602/12 P),
(2013/C 101/12).
86 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association: Special Issue on
Anti-circumvention (Fan Guibi Zhishi Zhuankan), 2009 Vol. 6, 8 May 2009.
87 Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2012 Vol. 10, 26 Oct.
2012.
88 See Newsletter of the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 2012 Vol. 3, 1
Apr. 2012. See also European Commission, Notice regarding the anti-dumping measures in force
on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China,
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4 A BETTER MODEL?
As we can see from the discussions above, the Quadrilateral Coordination
mechanism benefits from several important innovations, which makes it a better
model for public-private partnership than theTBI mechanism:
4.1 BETTER DESIGN
As mentioned earlier, the TBI mechanism is mainly a bilateral process that involves
the firm at one end, and MOFCOM at the other.While the mechanism envisages
the possibility of participation by industry associations, most national associations
do not provide much help due to their bureaucratic nature. In contrast, by
bringing in the local industry associations and local government, the Quadrilateral
Coordination mechanism provides the perfect remedy to the design flaw of the
TBI mechanism.
Historically, most national associations were established by the functional
ministries, which were separate from MOFTEC (the predecessor of MOFCOM)
and did not have expertise on foreign trade issues.To solve the problem, in the late
1980s, MOFTEC created seven associations specifically for importers and
exporters of various products.89 They are: China Chamber of Commerce for
Import and Export of Textile and Apparel (CCCT), China Chamber of
Commerce for Import and Export of Light Industrial Products and Arts-Crafts
(CCCLA), China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals & Chemicals
Importers & Exporters (CCCMC), China Chamber of Commerce for Import and
Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME), China Chamber of
Commerce of Foodstuffs and Native Produce (CFNA), China Chamber of
Commerce for Import & Export of Medicines & Health Products (CCCMHPIE),
and China International Contractors Association (CHINCA). While they have
much closer links with MOFCOM, they still have several problems. First, as we
can see from their names, their scopes are too broad and many products under
their coverage do not necessarily share the same traits.To reach a specific product,
one has to go through many levels of bureaucracy. For example, steel fasteners,
along with many other products such as ball bearings and chains, are under the
jurisdiction of the Machinery Components Branch, which is one of the twelve
different branches under the Department of Machinery Industry, which in turn is
following the recommendations and rulings adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Trade Organization on 28 Jul. 2011 in the EC – Fasteners dispute (DS397), (2012/C 66/06), 6
Mar. 2012.
89 Xinhua, Qida Shanghui Jiaqiang Hezuo Gongmou Fazhan (‘Seven Industry Associations
Strengthen their Cooperation for Future Development’), 30 Dec. 2001, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/chanjing/2001-12/30/content_219122.htm.
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one of the three departments in the CCCME.90 Thus, it is very difficult for them
to effectively identify and protect the interests of specific products. Second, the
national associations are typically based in Beijing and do not have branch offices
in the provinces. This makes it hard for them to reach out to firms in trade
remedies case, as most of them are based in distant provinces like Guangdong,
Fujian and Zhejiang.Third, as they target trading firms, the memberships in these
associations are typically limited to firms with foreign trade rights. Until the
revision of the Foreign Trade Law in 2004, trading rights could only be granted
after careful examination and approval from MOFCOM.91 The high threshold
effectively limited trading rights as a special privilege among State-owned
Enterprises (hereinafter ‘SOE’) and big firms. As they did not have trading rights,
most small and medium firms could not join the associations.
In comparison, the local industry associations do not have these problems.
First, their scopes are very narrow and tend to cover just a single product or several
closely-related products, which range from fasteners to parasols and cigarettes
lighters. Such high degree of specialization makes it easier for them to identify
specific trade measures that might affect the industry. Second, as there are high
degrees of specialization among different regions in provinces like Zhejiang and
Guangdong, industries tend to concentrate in blocks in specific cities or counties.
The establishment of local industry associations usually follows such pattern of
specialization and they are typically based in the cities or counties where most of
the major firms in the industry are located.This makes it easier for the associations
to reach out to the firms. Third, unlike the national associations, the local
associations accept both exporters and manufacturers as members, thus they are
more representative of the interests of the industry as a whole.
Similarly, the local government is also better positioned than MOFCOM in
dealing with the concerns of local firms or industries for several reasons. First, the
interests of the local government are closely aligned with the interests of local
firms or industries. If the firms do well, the region will have better economic
growth, generate more government revenue, and officials will also enjoy better
prospects of promotion. If the exports slow down due to foreign trade measures,
the officials have to worry about unemployment, sluggish economy, or even
demotion. In contrast, while MOFCOM is supposed to watch the export
performance of the whole country, it is only one of several economic-related
ministries in the central government and does not have responsibilities for the
wellbeing of firms in particular regions. To the contrary, at times, it might even
90 CCCME, Introduction to Our Organizational Structure, available at http://www.cccme.org.cn/
Help/CCCME_Introduction.pdf.
91 See Henry Gao, ‘China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective’, Singapore Year Book of
International Law 11 (2007): 60–61.
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sacrifice the interests of some region to safeguard the interests of the country as a
whole. Second, as MOFCOM is only one of many ministries in the central
government, the other ministries do not have to listen to them. Things are
different at the local government level.As shown by the Zhejiang Rules, the other
departments are required by the Provincial Government to cooperate with the
work of the provincial Department of Commerce.This makes it much easier for
the local government to help the firms.Third, as the local government is located in
the same province or city as the firms, it is much easier for them to communicate
or collaborate with the local firms.This is especially important for a country the
size of China.
4.2 BETTER COORDINATION
Compared to the TBI mechanism, the Quadrilateral Coordination system provides
a much better mechanism to coordinate the communication and collaboration
among the actors to maximize the synergy of their partnership. Such coordination
mechanism works at two levels:
4.2[a] External Coordination
This refers to the collaboration between the public sector and private sector,
which is also what the Quadrilateral Coordination system is designed for. Among
the four parties, MOFCOM and local government belong to the public sector,
while the private firm and industry association belong to the private sector.
Substantively speaking, the firms and MOFCOM are the two most important
actors in the public-private partnership.The firms are familiar with the conditions
of the foreign market and ultimately it is their interests that are at stake in trade
remedies cases. However, MOFCOM has the best expertise on trade laws and
WTO rules. It also has the exclusive power to hold bilateral consultations with the
foreign government and bringWTO cases, which are often the most effective ways
of dealing with trade barriers. However, as the experience of the TBI mechanism
has shown, without a proper coordination mechanism, it is hard to have the two
working together in real cases, let alone maximizing the synergy. In this regard, the
industry association and local government play key roles in linking up the firm and
MOFCOM.
The industry association maintains close links with all other three players.
First, as the local associations are typically established by the local firms, it has very
close ties to the firms. For example, the Jiaxing Fasteners Association was
established in 2005 by Gem-Year and four other firms, all of which are major
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players in the fasteners business.92 Second, the associations also maintain close
relationship with the government. For example, when the association fought the
battle against the EU anti-dumping measure, its Secretary General was Chen Lan,
who was at the same time the Director of the Division of Fair Trade in the Bureau
of Commerce of Jiaxing City.93 Up to now, the association is also housed in the
same building as the Bureau of Commerce, where the government officials work
just next door. Third, the associations also maintain good working relationship
with the national associations, which are under the supervision of MOFCOM and
thus have closer links. For example, in the EU anti-dumping case, the Jiaxing
Association worked together with the CCCME to petition the MOFCOM to
retaliate by conducting anti-dumping investigation against EU exports and
launchingWTO litigation.94
In contrast, while its link with the firms is weaker, the local government
usually has strong links with the other two players. As mentioned above, its link
with the industry association is reflected in the cross-staffing and sharing of
facilities between the two. Also, it maintains close link with MOFCOM through
the provincial Department or Bureau of Commerce, which is under the
professional guidance of MOFCOM.To enhance the link, the MOFCOM also has
Special Commissioner’s Offices in a dozen key cities in China, which can assist the
local governments on various trade issues.
4.2[b] Internal Coordination
Coordination also takes place among the actors within each sector. As mentioned
above, this includes the collaboration between the local government and
MOFCOM, as well as between private firms and industry associations. Moreover,
each of the four actors also has their internal coordination mechanism. The best
example is the division among different functional departments in the local
government, as illustrated by the Zhejiang Rules mentioned above. Similarly,
different departments within MOFCOM also have different tasks: the Economic
and Commercial Offices in China’s overseas missions are responsible for collecting
information on foreign anti-dumping action, and, with the assistance by the
Departments responsible for different regions, liaising with foreign governments,
firms and industry associations; the Bureau of Fair Trade is responsible for
coordinating the response to foreign anti-dumping actions, as well as conducting
92 Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, Qingkuang Jianjie (‘About Us’), available
at http://www.jxfastener.org/newsview.asp?folderid=0%3FWW%3F32.
93 Interview with Yang Fengdan at the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association, 21
Feb. 2013.
94 Ibid.
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anti-dumping investigations against foreign imports; the Bureau of Industry Injury
Investigation is responsible for the injury determination in such investigations; the
Department of Treaty and Law, along with the Department of WTO Affairs, are
responsible for WTO litigations against foreign anti-dumping measures. Among
the industry associations, the local ones are responsible for organizing and
coordinating the actions of firms in individual cases, while the national associations
mainly focus on lobbying MOFCOM and working with their foreign
counterparts. As to private firms, the smaller ones only need to submit the
completed questionnaires and participate in the collective response, which usually
contest only injury determination.As their stakes are smaller, they normally are not
expected to hire lawyers on their own on top of the ones assigned by the industry
association for the group. For bigger firms, however, they usually hire their own
lawyers as they wish to obtain individual dumping margins as well.Also, to prevent
the in-fight among the firms, they may not exclude other firms to participate in
the response or try to undermine each other.95
4.3 BETTER INCENTIVES
Trade remedies actions usually affect more than one firm from the same country. If
one firm makes a successful defence, the other firms might be able to free ride.
However, generally speaking, anti-dumping is less susceptible to free-riding
problem than safeguards or subsidy-countervailing measures.The reason for this is
because anti-dumping measures are supposed to be based on the individual
dumping margins of separate firms, which are supposed to vary among different
exporters. Nevertheless, this is not true in anti-dumping cases involving Chinese
firms, as China is regarded as a non-market economy, and normal value is
determined on the basis of constructed value in a surrogate country rather than
the actual prices charged by individual firms in the home market.96 While it is
possible to claim market economy treatment under the anti-dumping legislations
of some WTO Members such as the US and EU, the burdensome evidentiary
standards make such effort worthwhile only for bigger firms. Moreover, the injury
determination in anti-dumping cases is also based on the cumulative effects of all
dumped imports rather than that of individual firms.Thus, many firms, especially
smaller ones, still try to free-ride on the efforts of other firms.
To minimize free-riding problems, the Quadrilateral Coordination system also
introduces both rewards and penalties for firms. For example, according to the
95 Zhejiang Rules, Art. 12.
96 Section 15(a) of China’s WTO Accession Protocol, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001. For a detailed
discussion of the non-market economy issue, see Henry Gao, supra n. 91, at 55.
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principle of ‘only those who participate in the defence shall reap the benefits’,97
firms that actively participate in the defence shall receive preferential access to the
allocation of export quota for the export market upon successful defence. There
were also various schemes by the government providing monetary rewards to the
firms participating in the defence, but many of them have been discontinued to
comply with the rules under the SCMAgreement.
Other than not getting the rewards, the firms which fail to participate actively
in the defence may also be subject to the following penalties: public reprimand and
derogatory remarks in the credit record of the firm;98 expulsion from industry
associations, blacklisting and boycotting of firms caught quoting or selling products
at below-cost prices;99 and for extremely serious cases, revocation or suspension of
qualification for earmarked funds for foreign trade promotion or eligibility to
participate in various famous export brands programs.100
4.4 BETTER INSTITUTIONS
Under the TBI mechanism, it is hard for the firms to develop strong partnership
with MOFCOM as they only collaborate in individual cases on an ad hoc basis.To
solve this problem, the Quadrilateral Coordination system introduces a
comprehensive institutional framework, which is exemplified by the Foreign Trade
Pre-warning Centre (hereinafter ‘the Centre’). This institutional innovation was
first pioneered by Zhejiang Province,101 which also developed a set of guidelines
with both qualitative and quantitative requirements:102
First, the Centre shall be sponsored by an industry association that is
representative of the local industry. The Centre shall cover more than half of the
firms with at least USD 5 million worth of exports each;
97 MOFCOM Regulation, Art. 6.
98 Zhejiang Rules, Art. 21.
99 Zhejiang Fasteners Industry Association, Fair Trade Department, Zuzhi Jigou yu Gongzuo Yuan
(‘Organizational Structure and Plan of Action’), available at http://www.zjfastener.org/doc/09082
9/gongpingmaoyi.htm.
100 Zhejiang Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Guanyu Guanche Zhixing
<Zhejiangsheng Yingdui Chukou Fanqingxiao Zanxing Banfa> de Tongzhi (‘Notice on the
Implementation of Zhejiang Provisional Rules on Responding to Anti-dumping Cases against
Exports’), 28 Nov. 2006, Art. 5.
101 Feng Yuan, Zhejiang zai Quanguo Shuaixian Chengqi Duiwai Maoyi Yujingwang (‘Zhejiang
Pioneers with the First Foreign Trade Pre-warning Network in the Country’), 14 Apr. 2008, Jingji
Cankao Bao (‘Economic Information’), available at http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/wzpd/2008-04/14/
content_92892.htm.
102 Zhejiang Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Guanyu Jianshe ‘Duiwai
Maoyi Yujing Jizhi Shifandian’ de Gongzuo Zhidao Yijian (Guiding Advice on Establishing
‘Foreign Trade Pre-warning Mechanism Models’), 29 Mar. 2007.
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Second, the Centre shall have dedicated office facilities and staffed by full or
part-time officers.They shall be properly trained with knowledge on fair trade and
foreign trade warning system and be responsible for the collection, analysis,
dissemination of pre-warning information and the research and implementation of
counter measures.
Third, the Centre shall establish a web-based platform dedicated to the
collection and publication of pre-warning information. The website shall be
properly maintained with regular updates.
Fourth, the Centre shall publish on a regular basis analysis on the industry’s
exports, with at least two issues every year. It shall compile information on past
trade remedies cases affecting the industry. It shall promptly report pre-warning
information to the government and notify the firms. It shall compile pre-warning
report on a regular basis to monitor and analyse the export trends of the industry,
especially those in the key export markets. It shall submit at least two
comprehensive pre-warning reports to the Provincial Department of Commerce
every year.
Fifth, the Centre shall organize training courses or seminars on trade remedies
or technical barriers to trade measures whenever there is a need.
As of late 2011, Zhejiang Province has developed a comprehensive
pre-warning system that includes more than 100 pre-warning centres.103 Linking
up more than 6,000 firms in sectors ranging from textile and clothing, to steel,
consumer electronics and agricultural products, these centres cover every major
regional economic block in the province.104 On average, every centre has two full
time staff.105 They distribute pre-warning information to firms through
newsletters, websites, bulk text message broadcast, and instant messaging
programs.106 In 2010, for example, more than half a million pre-warning messages
was sent to the firms from the centres through websites and text messages.107
Based on the successful experience of Zhejiang, other provinces also established
similar pre-warning centres in recent years.
While the pre-warning system is very effective at warning firms against
potential risks, more substantive institutional framework is needed to respond to
actual investigations. Such framework is provided by the plan of action in
anti-dumping cases, which lays down a detailed working procedure that specifies
the course of action in key steps of the process. The Zhejiang Rules provides a
103 MOFCOM Buearu of Fair Trade, Jiaru Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi Yilai Zhejiang Yingdui Maoyi Moca
de Zuofa (‘Zhejiang’s Practices in dealing with Trade Frictions since WTO Accession’), 28 Oct.
2011, available at http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/d/da/201110/20111007802529.shtml.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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basic outline of the plan of action, but a more complete version can be found in
the Plan of Action (hereinafter the ‘Plan of Action’) for Anti-dumping Cases
drafted by the Department of Fair Trade of Zhejiang Fasteners Industry
Association, which states as follows:108
Before the initiation of investigation, the member firms shall actively participate in the
training activities organized by the association. When the firms obtain information on
anti-dumping and other important information, they shall promptly report to the
association and local government.
Once the investigation is initiated, the association shall immediately hold a meeting to prepare the
defense.To ensure timely response, the association shall set up a reserve fund with 400,000 RMB
drawing from the membership dues. Small and medium firms shall collectively hire lawyers and
prepare defense work. Key firms shall hire lawyers on their own. Before key firms taking any
important action, they shall seek advice from the local government and industry association and follow
their guidance.The firms shall accept the coordination of the association and cooperate fully with the
law firms to complete the questionnaire.To ensure the effectiveness of the collective defense, the firms
shall not exclude other firms from participating in the response. If a firm is among the top ten largest
exporters or has more than one million USD of exports involved in the case, it is normally expected
to participate in the defense. If it doesn’t, then it shall submit a written explanation to the local
government or association.
5 CONCLUDINGTHOUGHTS
Since its introduction in 2004,109 the Quadrilateral Coordination system has
quickly become the preferred model for public-private partnership in China.
MOFCOM has employed it in many trade remedies cases, especially anti-dumping
cases involving chemicals, machineries, and mechanical products. This article
discusses the differences between the Quadrilateral Coordination system and the
TBI mechanism, and explains why the Quadrilateral Coordination system works
better given the socio-economical backgrounds in China.
One thing worth noting is that the rise of the Quadrilateral Coordination
system in China appears to coincide with China’s rise from a reluctant participant
to an active player in the WTO dispute settlement system.110 In the view of the
author, this is more than just pure coincidence. Instead, as noted by Shaffer, ‘[t]o
litigate effectively in the WTO system, government officials need the specific
108 Zhejiang Fasteners Industry Association, supra n. 99.
109 Zhou Yang, ‘Siti Liandong’ Yingdui Maoyi Xintiaozhan (‘Quadrilateral Coordination system’ as
Response to New Trade challenges), 14 Sep. 2004, 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao (twenty-first Century
Business Herald).
110 See Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker,
and Maybe Rule Maker?, in Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck (ed.), Making Global Trade Governance
Work for Development, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 167–172; Henry Gao, ‘Taming the
Dragon: China’s Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’, Legal Issues of Economic
Integration 34, no. 4 (2007): 369–392.
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information that businesses and their legal representatives can provide. Officials
therefore strive to establish better working relations with industry on trade
matters’.111 Theoretically speaking, the best way to establish the working relations
is to build direct link between the firms and the government. However, as the
poor record of the TBI mechanism has shown, the Chinese government ran into a
dilemma when it tried to follow the American model in establishing the
partnership. On the one hand, as the firms did not have the habit of lobbying, the
government wants to encourage them to take more initiative. On the other hand,
if the firms become too active, they might pressure the government to take courses
of action against its wish. The Quadrilateral Coordination system solves the
dilemma by bringing in the industry association and local government, which act
as both facilitators and buffers. If the firms do not know how to take action, they
can help the firms to get on track. If the firms become too active, the industry
association and local government can keep them from going too far. In the end,
even though the process seems to become more complicated, the collaboration
becomes smoother as the two new actors make it easier for the firms and
government to communicate with each other.
In the view of the author, the Quadrilateral Coordination is an example of
‘managed lobbying’ that the government is trying to encourage in its interaction
with private firms. While the firms are encouraged to take more initiatives, the
government still wishes to manage the process and make sure that things are under
the guidance and direction of the government. If the firms get used to lobbying
the government on trade issues, they could well try to lobby the government on
other issues in due time.To prevent the undesirable spillover, the government has
to keep the lobbying carefully managed so that the floodgate will not be opened
inadvertently. Given the political reality in China, the Quadrilateral Coordination
system is likely to remain as the preferred approach for public-private partnership
in trade law for the foreseeable future.
111 See Shaffer, supra n. 1 at 143.
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